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President Bill Clinton stands in front of his limo in Moscow’s Red Square, in January 1994.

As Clinton became a frequent traveler to Russia and quickly plunged into statecraft, the promotion of democracy in Europe emerged as a primary US foreign policy goal. But it wasn’t clear that a military alliance like NATO would be the best way to advance that.

A debate over NATO’s merits erupted in Washington in the ’90s. George Kennan, the eminent architect of the Soviet “containment” strategy and a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, wrote in 1997 that expanding NATO would be a “fateful error” because it would “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion.” Kennan was far from alone in his criticism, as journalist Peter Beinart noted this week:

Thomas Friedman, America’s most prominent foreign policy columnist, declared it the “most ill-conceived project of the post-Cold War era.” Daniel Patrick Moynihan, widely considered the most erudite member of the US Senate, warned, “We have no idea what we’re getting into.”

Meanwhile, military leaders saw enlargement as detrimental to US interests, the Congressional Budget Office saw it as too expensive, and, later, intelligence agencies outright opposed adding Ukraine and Georgia. Clinton’s Secretary of Defense William Perry wrote in his memoir that he nearly resigned over enlargement.

The nascent European Union might have been the channel to consolidate democratic development in post-Soviet countries. Or Europe could have been engaged through the multinational Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or even through a focus on closer relationships with individual countries.

But Washington chose NATO.

In the early ’90s, that generation of national security operatives weren’t prepared to forfeit leverage in Europe. “NATO had to find something to do or go out of business, and these people who grew up all their lives alongside it would not let it go out of business,” said Barry Posen, a political scientist at MIT.

Jenonne Walker, who served in the Clinton White House, said she was among the minority who would have preferred the European Union as the mechanism for US engagement. “Almost everyone in the establishment wanted it to be through NATO, because that was where our influence was deemed to be greatest,” she said.

Clinton first floated a program that would be a gateway to NATO membership, called the Partnership for Peace, but that was ultimately dropped. By 1994, NATO said it “would welcome NATO enlargement that would reach to democratic states to our East,” and Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungry would be the first to join.

Electoral politics of the moment also reinforced Clinton’s decision to back NATO expansion. Republicans had won on that platform in the ’94 midterms. Ahead of the 1996 presidential election, “the domestic side of the White House” believed that growing the alliance would “play good with Polish American, Baltic American, Hungarian American communities,” explained Pifer.

President Clinton, his national security adviser Tony Lake, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were optimistic that NATO could branch out, with the possibility of a constructive relationship between NATO and Russia. As that trifecta supported adding member states, the NATO alliance became an organizing principle of US foreign policy going forward.

NATO enlargement reoriented America in the world

Initially, it took much political maneuvering for the newly united Germany to join NATO. The alliance added more eastern bloc counties in the late ’90s and early 2000s. The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the northern end of Russia’s western border joined NATO in 2005 without much fuss from Russia.

As it grew, NATO became a vehicle to address new global issues that worried US leaders. “Enlarging NATO becomes the gift that keeps on giving,” said Joshua Shifrinson, an international relations scholar at Boston University. “It was a way of incentivizing liberalization in countries that had been in the Communist bloc, showing that the US still has a mission in Europe, and a way of the US projecting power and checking alternative systems like the European Union.”

 Stephen Jaffe/AFP via Getty Images

Then-President Bill Clinton and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin at an economic summit in Auckland, New Zealand, in September 1999.

During the Cold War, NATO never engaged in military operations. But amid the Yugoslav conflict and Kosovo war of the ’90s, the alliance enforced a no- fly zone, then deployed a peacekeeping force, and in 1999 dropped hundreds of bombs on Yugoslavia. The whole process was delayed and disorganized, according to diplomats, and exposed NATO’s inadequacies in dealing with a hot war.

That pushed Clinton to embrace NATO further. “Our inaction was making NATO look weak and irrelevant,” said Walker, who went on to serve as ambassador to the Czech Republic from 1995 to 1998. “And the line in the halls of power in Washington was, ‘We have to enlarge NATO to save it, to make it look as though it were dynamic and on the move and not stagnant.’”

By taking on new military roles, the institution created new imperatives for itself. In the 2000s, NATO went to the front lines: fighting in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks and training Afghan forces starting in 2003, countering piracy in waters near Somalia, and then in a military intervention that was meant to protect civilians in Libya and went much further than its United Nations–approved mandate in toppling the tyrant Muammar Qaddafi.

Now, America’s foreign policy establishment is dominated by people who are even more committed to the alliance’s power than those who saved it in the 1990s. NATO’s existence and enlargement is a baseline assumption. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine aspire to join.

That has consequences. James Dobbins, who served as a senior diplomat in Europe during the ’90s and 2000s, says that a commitment to NATO expansion has limited Biden’s options. “It’s particularly out of tune — the idea that the United States should expand its defense perimeter to a half-dozen countries in Europe, when we should be shifting our focus on China,” Dobbins said.

At its core, this is about US power and how it has changed since the Soviet Union’s end. “It’s become a conversation about whether the US should be out in the world defending human rights and spreading democracy,” said Emma Ashford of the Atlantic Council. “Is the US out in the world to protect its own security or to be a crusading force for good?”

The Biden administration will now have to find its own answer.

Rep. Ken Buck (R-CO) and president of Microsoft Brad Smith arrive for a House
 Judiciary antitrust subcommittee hearing on regulation and competition in the news media industry on March 12, 2021. Drew Angerer/Getty Images

From left, Rep. Ken Buck (R-CO) and president of Microsoft Brad Smith arrive for a House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee hearing on regulation and competition in the news media industry on March 12, 2021.

Microsoft has also been careful to keep tabs on public sentiment and avoid (or stop) doing things that get the kind of negative attention that lead to, say, sweeping congressional investigations, bills targeted at curbing specific business practices, and crackdowns from government agencies.

“In many areas, like in how we run our app stores, we’ve tried to get ahead of where regulators and legislators are signaling they’re going, rather than fight needed change,” Alaily said.

With a few exceptions, lawmakers have skipped over Microsoft in their crusade to curb Big Tech’s power, even using Microsoft as a resource when investigating those companies. Microsoft was not only left out of the House Judiciary Committee Democrats’ report on competition in digital markets, but Smith was also invited to brief the House for it. Smith also testified against Google’s dominance before the House antitrust subcommittee last year. While Microsoft says some of the bills in Congress’s big antitrust package could apply to it as well, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google are very clearly the main targets of it.

Microsoft also has a long-established presence in DC, which it realized the need for when it got hammered decades ago. Its lobbyists have been working for years to build solid relationships with politicians. Smith is seen as an eager ambassador for Microsoft, while other companies had to go on apology tours that arguably came too late. When President Trump needed a company to buy off part of TikTok, he talked to Microsoft — in between tweets lashing out at other Big Tech companies.

“If you were to go back 10, 15 years ago, a lot of other tech companies just had this disdain for Washington and for lobbying in general,” said Nu Wexler, a DC-based communications consultant who worked in policy communications at Twitter, Google, and Facebook. “The other companies didn’t want to invest in their Washington offices. Microsoft … saw the need.”

Microsoft also knows how to play the antitrust compliance game. That yearslong consent decree forced its hand, sure. But even after that expired in 2011, Microsoft has been careful to look as though it’s toeing the line, rather than see if it can get away with crossing it.

Many now see Microsoft as having done its time, learned its lesson, and been punished enough. Even lawmakers who are usually eager to criticize Big Tech seemed almost positive about Microsoft’s Activision acquisition. Rep. Ken Buck, who has led the antitrust movement for Republicans in the House, tweeted that he was “encouraged” by Microsoft’s “assurances” to him that the merger would increase competition.

Microsoft’s antitrust outlook

Of all the acquisitions Microsoft could have chosen to make, the gaming industry — one of Microsoft’s more visible, consumer-facing segments — is the one that could elicit the most passionate responses from a sizable crowd. Including, very possibly, an FTC and DOJ looking for a merger to make an example of.

Microsoft points out that the acquisition would only make it third in the gaming market, which weakens the argument that it would suddenly own the space. But it also has its own gaming platform, the Xbox, and Windows PCs are the hardware of choice for big segments of gamers, too. Because the Activision acquisition would add some of the biggest games in the world (Candy Crush, Call of Duty, Overwatch, and World of Warcraft) to Microsoft’s game library (which already includes Minecraft, Halo, Gears of War, Age of Empires, and Fallout), there are concerns the company will make them all Xbox and/or PC exclusives. Or Microsoft could throw them all on its monthly Game Pass subscription service, which is available for most platforms but not PlayStation.

    <img alt="A young man wearing large headphones sits at a laptop at a table with other people, each playing a 

video game." src=“https://cdn.vox-cdn.com/thumbor/LNvsBGET0Bsf75nec4cE8avQ8yk=/800x0/filters:no_upscale()/cdn.vox- cdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/23197466/GettyImages_1053471666.jpg” /> Chesnot/Getty Images

A gamer plays Activision’s Call of Duty: Black Ops.

Daniel Hanley, senior legal analyst at Open Markets Institute, an anti-monopoly advocacy group, told Recode that the merger shouldn’t just be looked at in terms of where it will put Microsoft in the gaming market now, but the potential it has to disadvantage its competitors.

“It’s about what can Microsoft do with its portfolio of products and services, with this company, against its rivals and for the market?” Hanley said. “And what will happen to the market after Microsoft does this?”

Video game industry analyst Michael Pachter doesn’t think Activision will make Microsoft’s gaming arm too big to get enforcers’ approval, pointing out that even with Activision, Microsoft’s cut of the global video game market will only be 10 to 15 percent.

“Zero point zero percent chance that regulators in the US or the EU Competition Commission conclude that this makes them too big with pricing power,” Pachter said.

Pachter added that, to assuage concerns that Microsoft could act anti-competitively, the company can (and likely will) work something out with enforcement agencies. He sees Microsoft agreeing to conditions like not raising Game Pass prices for a set number of years and not pulling existing titles from PlayStation.

Microsoft says it intends to keep existing titles on other platforms, citing Call of Duty and PlayStation as an example. And it wants to move to a “player-centric” model, rather than a “device-centric” one.

“Gamers should be able to play whichever games they want, wherever they want, on whatever device they want,” Alaily said.

That might be a good business plan for Microsoft, as Xbox consoles are infrequent purchases from which the company doesn’t make a profit, while Game Pass is a consistent, monthly payment from 25 million people — a number that the acquisition will likely only add to. Detaching this from the Xbox gaming platform also lets Microsoft claim a much larger gaming market; it’s not just competing with Sony’s and Nintendo’s consoles, but also Apple’s mobile devices, Google’s cloud gaming service, Amazon’s gaming studio, and whatever Facebook is doing with the metaverse. It’s challenging the same Big Tech companies that regulators and lawmakers have been criticizing for years.

Microsoft will likely have to contend with scrutiny from the European Union, which is already looking into an antitrust complaint against Microsoft from cloud software company Nextcloud. The EU’s competition laws are stricter than those in the US, so maybe the people Microsoft really has to appease are across the Atlantic Ocean.

Microsoft expects to close the Activision deal sometime in fiscal year 2023, which starts this July. In US antitrust law, it’s illegal to monopolize; that is, to abuse a monopoly in ways that hurt competition and consumers. But it’s legal to be a big company, and it’s also legal to be a monopoly. Perhaps Microsoft is the best example of that now, after being an example of an illegal monopoly for so long.

“We’re hoping to accelerate this transition to subscription and cloud streaming that puts the player at the center of the experience,” Alaily said. “We feel really good about the deal.”

We’ll see if enforcers feel the same way.

The Commonwealth study wasn’t peer-reviewed, but it builds on a methodology that was. In a paper published this month in the journal JAMA Network Open, several of the same researchers estimated that Covid-19 vaccines averted more than 240,000 deaths between December 12, 2020, and June 30, 2021, before the worst of the delta variant ignited in the US.

In that same six-month window, vaccines were estimated to have prevented 1.1 million hospitalizations and halted 14 million infections, showing that more than 338 million doses had a powerful effect. “It was larger than we would’ve expected,” said coauthor Meagan Fitzpatrick, an infectious disease modeler at the University of Maryland.

Even now, Covid-19 vaccines are saving lives, and an estimate of the lives saved into 2022 would be even larger. The recent wave of infection in the United States spurred by the omicron variant may have already crested, and the proportion of deaths appears to be smaller than in previous surges. Vaccines have absorbed much of the shock.

The number of lives saved might not comfort those who have lost loved ones or are struggling with unemployment, social isolation, and the lasting effects of a Covid-19 infection. It may be a source of frustration, given that effective vaccines are going unused among millions of people, even as the unvaccinated form the dominant share of hospitalizations and deaths. Once vaccines were widely available, much of the suffering of the pandemic was avoidable. It still is.

The scale of the lives saved can still show how our actions now can prevent further misery and could shape the future of the pandemic for the better.

Covid-19 vaccines arrived in time to radically alter the pandemic

To figure out how many people would have died without vaccines, researchers drew on real-world observations of Covid-19 impacts on the population and actual vaccination rates across the US. They created a model of Covid-19 transmission and fit their model to what actually happened. From there, the scientists calculated what would have happened if there were no vaccines (as well as if the vaccination rate were halved).

The results showed that the timing of the vaccines — which were developed faster than any new vaccine in history — had a huge impact. In the US, vaccines began distribution in December 2020, and they were offered to all US adults by April 2021. The mass-vaccination campaign kicked in just as the country was facing a major wave of new cases.

“Not only did our vaccination program really suppress the ongoing surge … but it also helped avoid a later spring wave that would have happened with variant emergence,” said Fitzpatrick. “I think the main takeaway is really focusing on speed and not just coverage. The emphasis that we had on getting the vaccines out fast … was the right impulse.”

These conclusions line up with other estimates of lives saved. Sumedha Gupta, a health policy economist at Indiana University—Purdue University Indianapolis, created a model that used the varying vaccination rates between states as a natural experiment. Gupta and her team found that by May 9, 2021 — less than six months into the vaccination effort — vaccines had already prevented 140,000 people from dying.

Gupta found that the most vulnerable groups benefited the most: the elderly, the immunocompromised, those with preexisting health conditions. But the Covid-19 vaccines also had knock-on impacts because they slowed the transmission of the virus, which helped protect unvaccinated people too.

They were also an immense bargain. The US government spent upward of $40 billion to develop Covid-19 vaccines, but Gupta estimated their value in terms of lives saved — just a few months into the campaign — at as much as $1.4 trillion.

These studies focused on the US, which has managed to vaccinate a majority of its population. But the sheer impact of vaccines highlights how much unnecessary suffering is continuing in places that are still struggling to get enough shots. Continuing to invest in the ongoing vaccination effort, not only in the US but also globally, would likely tip the scale even further. “That seems like a no-brainer,” Gupta said.

How can vaccines reach their full potential?

Covid-19 is still here, and about a quarter of the US population — more than 80 million people — haven’t received the shots at all.

That means that the benefits of vaccines have not been exhausted, and some of the misery right now is avoidable. “We’re really leaving benefits on the table,” Gupta said.

It may seem puzzling that half of all US Covid-19 deaths — that’s more than 430,000 people — occurred after vaccines began rolling out. That share will grow for as long as people keep dying of Covid-19.

But the large majority of the people hospitalized and dying of Covid-19 right now are unvaccinated. Compared to vaccinated people, the unvaccinated are 15 times as likely to die from Covid-19, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

At the same time, the virus is changing in ways that allow it to better evade vaccines, as the omicron variant has shown. Immunity from vaccines also wanes over time. “What we’re still seeing right now is that omicron is undermining the protection that we had previously seen from both vaccines and natural infection,” Fitzpatrick said.

While the US has leaned hard on vaccines in its Covid-19 strategy, it has neglected other ways to limit the impacts of the infection. The US government has only recently begun to distribute free rapid Covid-19 tests and high-quality face masks on a large scale. Much of the infrastructure for reporting tests and tracing contacts of infected people remains an ad hoc patchwork, making it difficult to track and respond to outbreaks. Public gatherings have resumed across the country and mask mandates have been lifted, even in places where Covid-19 transmission remains high.

Without these so-called non-pharmaceutical interventions, the shortcomings of the vaccination program have become more apparent as new variants have emerged. “It really was a problem of too much hubris, that [many believed] vaccines would be the only thing we needed,” said Fitzpatrick. “It’s not ‘either/or,’ it’s ‘both-and.’”

These lessons extend beyond the current pandemic. Covid-19 vaccines are an example of what’s possible with enough urgency, resources, and know-how. Deploying the same tactics to other illnesses could prevent even more suffering.

Looking at the pandemic through the lens of saving lives is a case for not giving up. We may not be able to prevent every death, every new mutation, or every future pandemic. But we have far more agency than we may realize, and with a more thoughtful public health strategy, many more lives can be saved.

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